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I.
INTRODUCTION
The appellant-respondent will not make a long reply
to Mr. Mullins1 petition for re-hearing.

There has already

been filed and considered by the Court almost one hundred
pages of briefing, excluding the additional 25 pages in Mr.
Mullins1 latest petition for re-hearing.
However, this response is thought required to note
certain inconsistencies and erroneous citations of the
record and case law submitted by Mr. Mullins.
II.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
CONTRARY TO THE ASSERTION OF RESPONDENT-MULLINS,
NO THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE WAS EVER PLEAD, PROVED, OR MADE
AN ISSUE IN THIS PROCEEDING, BUT IS ASSERTED FOR THE
FIRST TIME IN PETITIONER'S BRIEF FOR RE-HEARING.
There exists no pleading and no facts to support
the respondent-Mullins' new theory announced for the first
time in its petition for re-hearing.

On page 3 of his

latest brief, respondent-Mullins asserts that Royal Industries should be held liable for "negligence" in failing to
"... acquaint itself with the obligations of the selling
corporation (the non-party Arizona corporation)."

Petition

for Re-Hearing, p.3. (Emphasis added).
This Court has clearly and consistently held that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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matters not plead and properly presented to the lower
court cannot be considered for the first time on appeal.
It has said:
"Orderly procedure, whose principal
purpose is the final settlement of controversies, requires that a party must present
is entire case and his theory or theories of
recovery to the trial court; and having done
so, he cannot change to some different theory
and thus attempt to keep in motion a merry-goround of litigation." Simpson v. General
Motors Corp., 24 Ut.2d. 301, 470 P.2d. 399,
401 (1970); See also, Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Ut.
2d. 366, 482 P. 2d. 702; Smith v. Deniro,
28 Ut. 2d. 259, 501 P.2d. 265 (1972); Nickle v.
Guarascio, 28 Ut. 2d. 425, 503 P.2d. 861 (1972).
Certainly, such a meritorious rule is even more applicable
when a litigant attempts such an allegation for the first
time in a petition for re-hearing.
However, even accepting arguendo that such a
position can or should now be considered by the Court, the
testimony was clear and unrebutted that Royal Industries
did not have actual knowledge of these transactions between
Mr. Mullins and the two non-party Arizona corporations.
Rather, this particular matter was in the Arizona corporations1
archives and they were not in fact inspected. (R-2; R-916,
R-910-911, 918; A-278, 274-275, 280). Further, there was no
evidence to suggest a sinister motive on the part of Royal
Industries or anyone else as nakedly intimated by the
petitioner.

These were merely dead file records to which

Royal, of course, had access, but which no one reasonably
would examine.

The only evidence on this point was by
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Mr. Freedman who testified that Royal Industries retained
an independent accounting firm to audit these Arizona
companies and that in his expert C.P.A. opinion, all
the examination was done in accordance with good business
and accounting principles.

(A-

It is also to be noted that this Court correctly
stated in its decision that, by Mr. Mullins1 own admission, the agreement for a commission did not run into
perpetuity.

Rather, Mr. Mullins was to receive a

commission only so long as the Arizona corporation
manufactured the machines.

He stated:

"The agreement was that he would pay
me two percent of the selling price of the
machine, as long as he manufactured them."
(Testimony of Walter Mullins, R-597; A-104-105;
see also discussion thereof at page 49 and 50
of defendants-appellants original brief).
The Court was absolutely correct in its observation on
page 3 of its decision that:
"The right of Mr. Mullins to a commission
was limited to machines made by the R. M. Evans
Company, Inc. If the company made and sold no
machines, then no commissions would be due Mr.
Mullins, and he would have no basis for an action
on his contracts against the R. M. Evans Company."
Respondent-Mullins has filed in his petition for re-hearing
as well as in his brief in the principal case, to address
this underlying term of the agreement on which he based
his claim.
It is and was uncontested that the two Arizona
corporations survived the sale of assets and assumption
of certain liabilities by Royal Industries.

Thus, the
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opinion of the Court was absolutely correct in ruling
as a matter of law that there was no obligation which
could be and need be assumed by Royal Industries, Inc.
POINT II
THE BUY/SELL AGREEMENT OF ROYAL INDUSTRIES WAS
NOT A "MERGER" AGREEMENT AND CONTRARY TO THE ASSERTION
OF COUNSEL, BY ITS TERMS DID NOT ASSUME "ALL" OF THE
LIABILITIES OF THE TWO ARIZONA CORPORATIONS.
The touchstone

of respondent-Mullins! petition

for re-hearing is his desperate attempt to merge the
two Arizona corporations, which are non-parties to this
action, and Royal Industries.

He does that by repeatedly

calling the buy/sell agreement a "merger" agreement and
substantially stretching the record; as a result, Mr.
Mullins1 own petition is internally inconsistent.

The

Court's attention is drawn to page 9 of the Petition for
Re-hearing, where Mr. Mullins states:
"It is clear from the testimony of Mr.
Freedman that Royal Industries intended to
accept and thought they were getting all of
the liabilities of the Evans companies (two
Arizona corporations) except those enumerated
specifically in the agreement as being reserved."
(See page 9 and 10 of Mullins1 Petition for Rehearing) .
Compare this unsupported statement with the actual language
of the contract quoted on page 14 of the Petition for Rehearing.

Here the actual language of the contract is

quoted states that Royal was going to assume "... substantially all of the corporations1 (two Arizona corDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

porations) liabilities."
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A further examination of that contract demonstrates that those assumed liabilities were enumerated in
detail and were included as a part of the purchase price.
Likewise, the assets which were being acquired were enumerated with specificity.

In fact, the agreement on numerous

occasions explicitedly stated in various ways the following:
"Notwithstanding any other statement herein
to the contrary, the assumption by Royal of the
debts, liabilities and obligaions of the corporation (two non-party Arizona corporations) shall
expressly exclude ... (5) any liabilities or
obligations of the corporation of any nature,
whether absolute, accrued, contingent or otherwise,
... not reflected or reserved against on the balance
sheet of the corporation as of August 31, 1968 ..."
(See Exhibit 45 at pages 20 and 21) (Emphasis added).
Thus, it is respectfully submitted:

(1) Even if a negligence

theory were supported by case law, petitioner cannot now
raise it for the first time in this petition for re-hearing;
(2) The Mullins commission agreement, by its own terms,
expired before the sale of assets to Royal Industries;
and (3) The Buy/Sell agreement of Royal Industries and the
Arizona corporations expressly did not include the assertion
by Royal of any claims, other than those enumerated and listed
therein.

The decision of this Court should not be disturbed.
POINT III.

THE CASE AUTHORITY CITED BY RESPONDENT-MULLINS
IS INAPPLICABLE TO FACTS OF THE INSTANT CASE.
The respondent-Mullins has cited, at substantial
length, an opinion from the Third Circuit called Knapp v.
North Am.Rockwell Corp., (C.A. 3rd, 1974) 506 Fed.2d.361
(19 74).

However, that case did not involve a contract
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assumption, much less a negligent assumption, issue; further,
it did not involve any liability accruing by virtue of a
commission agreement or any contract principles whatsoever.
Rather, that case concerned the tort liability of one corporation which acquired the assets of another corporation, for
injuries caused by defective products manufactured by
the other corporation before the date of acquisition.

This

point was succinctly summarized by Circuit Judge Rosenn
as follows:
"The majority holds that, under certain
circumstances, a corporation which acquires substantially all of the assets of another corporation may be held liable for injuries caused by
defective products manufactured by the other
corporation before the date of acquisition. In
the instant case, they conclude that, even though
the transaction was structured as a sale of assets,
it should be 'treated as a 'merger1 for the
purpose of imposing tort liability.'" Id at
p. 370 (Emphasis added).
Significantly, the rationale behind the decision was
based upon the Federal Court Judgment as to what would be
the applicable state law under the circumstances.

In doing

so, the Court was substantially influenced by what it construed to be Pennsylvania public policy for imposing tort
liability upon those individuals most able to spread the
loss.

In doing so, it reasoned from a Pennsylvania decision

holding a governmental immunity statute invalid because
such a ruling would spread personal injury loss to those
most able to bear it.

See Court discussion and rationale

id at p. 369.
In making its decision, the Court candidly admitted
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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it was basing its decision on this philosophical
extention of Pennsylvania case law.

It stated:

"If we are to follow the philosophy of the
Pennsylvania Courts that questions of an injured
party's right to seek recovery are to be resolved
by an analysis of public policy considerations
rather than by a mere procrustean application
of formalities, we must consider whether the
TMW-Rockwell exchange was a merger, evaluate
the public policy implication of that determination." Id at p. 369.
The Court then noted:
"As between these two parties, however,
Rockwell is better able to spread the burden
of the loss."
Thereafter the Court observed that Rockwell could have
protected itself by obtaining insurance and stated:
"Rockwell could have protected itself from
sustaining the brunt of the loss by securing from
TMW an assignment of TMW's insurance. There is
no indication in the record that such an assignment
would have placed the burden on either Rockwell
or TMW since TMW had already purchased the insurance protection, ..." Id at p. 370.
The Court, therefore, held:
"In the absence of contrary controlling
decisions by the Pennsylvania Courts, we conclude
that the State Judiciary would have adopted the
rule of law that appears to better reason and
more consistent with social policies set forth
in recent Pennsylvania cases." Id at p. 370
(Emphasis added).
It is,therefore, clear that the decision was underpinned on the principle that when a corporation acquires
the assets of another, tort liability should be assumed by
the acquiring corporation because:
(1)

The acquiring corporation is better able to

spread the loss of that injury, and
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(2)

It could have easily protected itself by

acquiring the insurance maintained by the
previous manufacturing organization.
Those policy considerations are totally inapplicable to
the instant case, which involves a commission contract
for the payment of commissions for a limited time period.
This Court in its decision correctly noted that
the commission agreement by respondent-Mullins' own
testimony was limited in time and duration.

It was only

to continue so long as the Arizona corporation made the
machines.

See discussion supra at p.4. As opposed to

the case before the barf there was no tort injury, no
insurance to be assigned, and no public policy considerations of the nature enunciated in the Knapp decision.
Thus, it is respectfully submitted that the
authority cited is totally inapplicable to the facts of the
case now before the bar.

The question of merger was fully

discussed and argued in the previous brief submitted to the
Court.

(See appellant's original brief at pp 15-22, 33-35;

cf. appellant-Royal Industries, Inc. brief at pp 2 8-34).

There

are presented in this petition for re-hearing no new relevant
authority or facts from those previously considered by the
Court.

Not only do the facts not justify the merger theory,

but more importantly, such a theory is irrelevent to a
contract which by its own terms was terminated and fulfilled.

-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CONCLUSION
This Court properly disposed of the issues and
rendered a correct decision.

It is respectfully submitted

that the matters now urged upon the Court by Petitioner
are either irrelevant or issues already fully briefed,
argued and correctly decided by the Court against the
Petitioner.

The previous decision of this Court should

not be reconsidered.
Respectfully submitted,

Lynn G. Foster

Roger F. Cutler,
Attorneys for defendantsappellants.

(

{

i

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

